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Introduction 
Those who study organizational failure commonly diagnose the root cause as breakdowns 
in information sharing. A vivid example is the failure of US intelligence agencies to share 
information that, in retrospect, might have prevented 9/11. This interpretation holds that the FBI 
and CIA could have shared important leads to prevent the attacks but instead responded to what 
those agencies perceived to be tournament incentives under which only one agency within the 
broader security and threat-prevention apparatus of the US government could expect to be 
rewarded (financially and otherwise) for stopping an impending threat. In this view, misaligned 
incentives led to "turf issues" (i.e., parochialism reflecting incompatible objectives between 
subsidiary and parent organizations) which caused the quantity and quality of information 
sharing to fall significantly short of the levels necessary for achieving the parent organization's 
primary objective. 
Insufficient information sharing as a root cause of failure to prevent the attacks featured 
prominently in rationales given by those who then pushed for the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002 and passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. The dramatic reorganization of 22 agencies into the DHS and 
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implementation of IRTPA were carried out by officials who frequently stated the goal of 
transforming incentives to better facilitate cooperative rather than rival motives among 
subsidiary agencies when making decisions about information to be shared. This goal of 
transforming incentives led to the creation of new administrative roles, such as Chief Information 
Sharing Officer for the FBI, the Information Sharing Council to advise the US President, and the 
Information Sharing Environment Program Manager appointed by the US President.2 New 
private organizations appeared as well. For example, the Information Technology Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC), according to its website (https://www.it-isac.org/), 
works with intelligence agencies on "homeland security issues," seeking legislation to limit 
liability when private firms share information with government agencies and greater access to 
classified information for firms in a position to help defend against attacks in cyberspace and 
beyond. The claim that incentive effects in the context of information sharing are important 
enough to justify dramatic organizational overhaul (e.g., creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security and new patterns of wider disbursement of funding for anti-terror programs 
since 9/11) draws on surprisingly scant empirical research and behavioral testing on information-
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 The diagnosis of information-sharing failures as a root cause of 9/11 appears, for example, in 
the executive summary of the FBI's 2011 Information Sharing Report: "Since September 11, 
2001, the FBI has shifted from a traditional crime-fighting agency into an intelligence-led, 
threat-driven organization, guided by clear operational strategies. Today’s FBI is focused on 
predicting and preventing the threats we face while at the same time engaging with the 
communities we serve. This shift has led to a greater reliance on technology, collaboration, and 
information sharing" (FBI, 2011, accessed January 18, 2013, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/national-information-sharing-strategy-1/national-information-sharing-
strategy). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) similarly issues reports on and 
allocates substantial administrative resources regarding its information sharing capability (CDC, 
2013). 
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sharing responses to cooperative versus tournament incentives. This paper attempts to fill that 
gap.  
Wageman and Baker (1997) demonstrated incentive effects on group cooperation using 
task designs with varying degrees of interdependence. Undertaking to formalize and extend the 
seminal paper of Wageman and Baker to the context of information-sharing behavior, a 
companion paper of ours proposed a one-shot information-sharing game in which zero sharing is 
the inefficient Nash Equilibrium under tournament incentives and efficient (i.e., Pareto-Optimal) 
sharing is the Nash Equilibrium under cooperative incentives. The present paper uses that 
information-sharing game to elicit new empirical information about experimental participants' 
responses to shifts in incentives in repeated interaction. The theoretical model's unequivocal 
predictions apply to a one-shot interaction. In contrast, the conditions under which stable patterns 
of information sharing emerge in repeated interaction, which is more characteristic of the 
organizational settings the model is intended to represent, are more subtle and in general non-
unique. This motivates the empirical study of repeated information-sharing behavior. 
The results provide confirmatory support for the frequent finding of counterproductive 
effects of competition on task performance reported by Campbell and Furrer (1995) and 
numerous others, extending that finding to the context of information-sharing tasks. In addition 
to intelligence agencies such as the FBI and CIA,  other interpretations3 of the information-
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 Links between information sharing and organizational success have numerous antecedents that 
include a broad range of applications outside the context national security and intelligence 
sharing. Dawes (1998) describes barriers and risks to information sharing within government 
organizations (that have no explicit ties to intelligence gathering ) and suggests ideas for 
enhancing transmission of information. Connelly, Zweig, Webster and Trougakos (2012) detail 
challenges that organizations face in facilitating knowledge transfer; they introduce a 
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sharing game include: multinational firms transmitting cost and demand data among subsidiaries; 
marketing and strategy tasks requiring aggregation of consumer data from multiple locations; 
scientific networks attempting to synergistically aggregate information from different labs or 
research groups; transfer pricing as a signaling mechanism for coordinating outputs of 
intermediate and final goods among geographically dispersed divisions; and supply chain 
management.  
Given the many excellent studies of the effects of incentive schemes on cooperation and 
organizational performance that the organizational psychology literature already provides, it is 
worth drawing explicit links to closely related predecessors that motivate this paper's approach 
while emphasizing what is new. Previous papers usefully characterized information-sharing 
decisions as public goods games (Whitley, 2003; Cabrera and Cabrera's, 2002; Tsai, 2002; and 
Monge et al., 1998). This insight guided our attempts to formalize sub-optimal informational 
sharing in a model with payoff parameters that could capture contrasting cooperative and 
tournament incentives, and then empirically measure: how much information people share under 
                                                                                                                                                             
quantitative measure of knowledge hiding that captures more richly what this paper attempts to 
capture with the binary event of "falsification"(i.e., sharing information that one knows to be 
false to another member of the organization). The supply chain management literature presents 
numerous models in which information sharing is the main object of study (Lee, So and Tang, 
2000; Chen, 2003; Fiala, 2005; Li and Lin, 2006; Zhou and Benton, 2007; Sahin and Robinson, 
2007). Additional studies of information sharing to which the information-sharing game can be 
applied includes a considerable breadth of important papers in transfer pricing, bilateral 
negotiation, and marketing and strategy involving decision makers in multiple locations 
(Ackelsberg and Yukl, 1979; Dejong, Forsythe, Kim, and Uecker, 1989; Chalos and Haka, 1990; 
Ravenscroft, Haka, and Chalos, 1993; Luft and Libby, 1997; Avila and Ronen, 1999; Ausubel, 
Cramton, and Deneckere, 2002; Fatima, Wooldridge, and Jennings, 2005;  Sawers and Liao, 
2005; Cheng and Hsieh, 2009). 
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different incentives, their propensities to falsify information, and rates of success in achieving 
accurate aggregations of data their organizations required them to know.4  
Recent thinking on organizational incentives have, in some important settings, moved 
away from binary taxonomies for the incentives that influence cooperation (e.g., cooperative 
versus individualistic) and toward a mixed approach acknowledging that individual and 
collective rewards can function complementarily (Wagner, Humphrey, Meyer and Hollenbeck, 
2012). Our experiment exposes all participants to both cooperative and tournament incentives in 
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 Whitley (2003) emphasizes the distinct dimensions of autonomy and authority that generate a 
wide variety of institutional forms which organizations use to solve collective action and other 
coordination problems.  Cabrera and Cabrera's (2002) study of "knowledge-sharing dilemmas" 
describes coordination and incentive problems surrounding information sharing as a public 
goods game amenable to shifts in incentive schemes to motivate improved quantities and quality 
of information sharing. Their proposed framework is perhaps closest in spirit to the present 
paper's. The formal model that formed the basis for this paper's experimental design follows 
Cabrera and Cabrera's (2002) description. Importantly, Cabrera and Cabrera (2002) propose that 
internal transmission of information is costly (in the eyes of individuals and subsidiaries within 
an organization). By introducing a monetary cost of information sharing, we undertake once 
again to capture Cabrera and Cabrera's notion of costly information transmission that provides 
the central economic trade-off between expected benefits versus costs of information sharing. 
Monge, Fulk, Kalman, Flanagin, Parnassa and Rumsey (1998) propose a theoretical model that 
provides additional motivation for the formulation of information sharing as a public goods or 
collective action game. Our experimental design facilitates empirical tests for those incentive 
effects predicted by theory that are straightforward to implement as hypothesis tests of algebraic 
restrictions on regression coefficients. Tsai (2002) uses socio-metric measures in a hierarchical 
modeling framework to study incentive effects on information sharing within a multi-unit 
organization where subsidiaries compete for market share and internal resources. 
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randomized order, and our data analysis looks for evidence of combined exposures improving 
performance or otherwise giving rise to distinct behavioral responses.  
Compared to studies based on rich ethnographic and interview data that provide detailed 
accounts of the processes and institutions that enable information sharing in geographically 
dispersed teams (Baba, Gluesing, Ratner and Wagner, 2004), the theory and experimental 
protocol in this paper may strike some readers as psychologically narrow given its reliance on 
monetary payoffs as the mechanism for modeling incentives. As discussed in subsequent 
sections of this paper, however, the data reveal behavioral patterns that cannot be explained 
solely in terms of self-interested payoff maximization.5 The simplicity of the reward structure 
(based on payments for accuracy in anonymous interactions sustained over four sets of 16 
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 The present paper's simple payoff structure should be interpreted as complementary with more 
complex sociological theory and empirics on multi-national organizations. For example, Vora 
and Kostova (2007) report empirical findings related to ours based on constructs from social 
identity theory that influence subsidiary-parent cooperation and knowledge transfer. Interesting 
sociological modulators of incentive effects are reported in Quigley, Tesluk, Locke and Bartol 
(2007). Eby and Dobbins (1997) investigate psychometric correlates of self-reported collectivism 
at individual and group levels. Golden and Raghuram (2010) provide empirical detail about 
social influences on teleworkers' information sharing. Shared cognition of course involves much 
richer informational exchange than the mere transmission of data. Nevertheless, similar sets of 
issues regarding how to measure information sharing and evaluation of its effects arise in Salas 
and Cannon-Bowers (2001) and Ensley and Pearce (2001). Intra-organization information 
sharing is a longstanding research focus in the management information science literature (e.g., 
Barrett and Konsynski, 1982).  Haas and Park (2010), and Rotolo and Petruzzelli (2012) 
investigate the problem of academic researchers withholding information and the role of both 
peer effects and incentives in explaining observed patterns of information sharing--yet another 
organizational domain where the model in this paper and its focus on tension between 
cooperative versus individualistic incentives is applicable. 
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experimental rounds) generates sharp behavioral findings implying the existence of important 
motives outside the standard rational actor model. The design's simple payoff structure (not 
embedded in richly contextualized organizational narrative) also permits a rather broad range of 
interpretations as mentioned already. 
Another goal of the experimental analysis is to investigate the persistence of previous 
incentive schemes after they have been replaced by new ones, interpreted as historical (or path-) 
dependence when new incentive schemes are introduced.  Managers would want to understand 
the potential for path-dependence to affect the magnitudes and timing of behavioral responses to 
new incentives, as well as the need for other supportive interventions that may be required to 
successfully transition away from entrenched non-cooperative organizational culture rooted in 
narrowly individualistic reward schemes from the past. In the other direction, persistence of 
cooperative information sharing during temporary spells in which rewards become more 
individualistic could add to an organization's understanding of the value of its cooperative 
institutions. Nalbantian and Schotter's (1997) work demonstrates persistence of cooperation after 
incentive schemes shift from team-based to individual rewards. In contrast, Harbring (2010) 
shows persistence of non-cooperative behavior when transitioning from environments with 
dysfunctional competitive incentives toward reward schemes designed to facilitate greater 
cooperation.6 The experimental design adopted in this paper enables formal tests of order-of-
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 Economists have also studied information sharing as a function of characteristics of good or 
demand behaviour (i.e., complements versus substitutes) (Cason, 1994) and the role of 
information sharing in achieving optimality (Vives, 1984; Li, 1985). In transfer pricing 
applications that require extensive information transmission among subsidiaries of a 
multinational organization, inaccurate information received from others leads to the so-called 
transfer price expectations gap, which impedes progress in bargaining and leads to suboptimal 
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treatment effects that, while limited by the brief period of interaction in the experimental lab, 
provides suggestive evidence that such phenomena are likely to exist.  
Another potentially important channel through which the results in this paper translate 
into insights for designing incentive mechanisms that support information sharing is Gigone and 
Hastie's (1993) "common knowledge effect." Gigone and Hastie showed that information 
distributed to all group members influences judgments more than information that is only 
partially distributed does. This effect has potential to influence the weight that subsidiaries place 
on different pieces of information in their possession, as a function of how widely distributed 
that information is. The common knowledge effect might therefore interfere with an 
organization's information sharing by distorting attention away from privately held information 
or, alternatively, could be used strategically to induce subsidiaries to place greater weight on 
particular pieces of (widely distributed) information. In addition to cooperative and tournament 
incentive treatments, our experimental design also includes treatments varying the size of 
participants' information endowments. Low-information treatments partition the organization's 
database into equal, non-overlapping information endowments. High-information treatments 
provide participants with larger information endowments that overlap. Treatments that vary the 
quantity of information that each player initially possesses reveal a paradoxical less-is-more 
effect: when everyone has less information, they share more. The final section of this paper 
                                                                                                                                                             
outcomes (Linhart and Radner, 1992; Chang, Cheng, and Trotman, 2008). Chalos and Haka 
(1990) demonstrate that subsidiaries frequently act on incentives to advance the subsidiary's 
interests at the expense of others (and the entire organization's profits), by withholding 
information and exploiting the parts that remain private.  
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briefly discusses the cautionary implications of this finding with regard to the apparent "more-is-
better" approach to collecting information in many real-world organizations including the DHS. 
 
Hypotheses 
Given the dramatic reorganizations mentioned in the introduction seeking to improve 
information sharing, it would seem that studying how people making repeated decisions about 
how much information to share, whether to share honestly, and whether to trust what is shared by 
others, are clear research priorities. This paper seeks a descriptive account of these information-
sharing behaviors based on experimental data and game theory, with which to measure incentive 
effects that affect organizational performance. The experimental design based on the 
information-sharing game makes the assumption that organizational performance depends on the 
objective accuracy that teams are able to achieve after making decisions about how much 
information to share and whether to deliberately share false information.  
The data reporting in the following sections seek to answer five basic questions about 
incentive effects on the dynamics of information sharing in an otherwise neutral environment 
without contextualizing narrative as part of a particular organization, without priming language 
regarding team and organizational membership that might encourage cooperation, and without 
face-to-face contact or communication other than those information-sharing decisions that are 
passed to other players electronically7: 
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 Although common in some subfields of behavioral science such as experimental economics, 
neutral-language experimental design as a methodological choice attracts heated debate. In 
psychology, context-neutral design is criticized by those arguing from Brunswikian (and other) 
methodological viewpoints that rich contextualization improves data quality by reducing noise 
from unobservable framing in the minds of experimental participants.  The goal of our 
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(1) Do cooperative incentives that reward all team members for success by any one 
member generate optimal or near-optimal levels of information sharing? 
(2) In contrast, do tournament incentives rewarding only a single person who first 
achieves success (or a single division within a multi-divisional organization) induce 
people to share no information as theory predicts? 
(3) How do cooperative versus tournament incentives affect team members' propensities 
to falsify information, even though doing so is costly and never an own-payoff-
maximizing strategy? 
(4) Do incentive schemes have important effects on the objective accuracy of the 
aggregated databases that individuals achieve? 
(5)  Does the ex-ante quantity of information that individuals (or divisions) are endowed 
with prior to making decisions on information sharing and falsification affect 
quantities shared, rates of falsification and accuracy?   
 
Experimental Design 
The experiment is designed to follow a game-theoretic model whose expected payoff 
matrices and Nash equilibria are presented in Appendices 1 and 2. Two players representing 
divisions of a multi-location organization make three simultaneous decisions: the number of 
database entries to share, referred to as passing or transmitting information to another player 
representing a distinct division within the organization; whether to falsify the information passed 
to other players; and whether to distrust (as opposed to use at face value) the information 
                                                                                                                                                             
experimental design is to provide clean and simple tests of incentive effects on quantities of 
information shared, rates of falsification, and accuracy. 
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received from other players. Each player receives an information endowment containing a partial 
list of entries from the organization's complete database, which is known to be accurate but 
distributed in discrete information endowments allocated across different players or divisions. 
Payoff maximization requires each player to gather enough information to form an accurate view 
of the organization's complete database. This database describes a mapping from characteristics 
into "targets," which can be thought of as a dataset on which the organization's success requires a 
regression analysis to uncover the true conditional expectation represented by the complete set of 
database entries. If any person had access to all players' information endowments, then he or she 
would have a perfect (or at least the best possible) estimate of the regression on which the 
organization's success depends.  
To keep the information-gathering task easy to understand, each database entry consists 
of only three binary variables, which is simply a row vector associating two observable 
characteristics (i.e., cues or predictors) with a y-variable coding target/non-target status. For 
example, Table 1 shows an example of a complete database (which no player has access to prior 
to sharing information) comprised of four entries (i.e., row vectors referred to as database 
entries) that record nationality, language spoken, and target/non-target status. The complete 
database in Table 1 indicates that a non-Pakistani Pashto speaker is a target and that all other 
combinations of Pakistani and Pashto-speaking characteristics are not targets. 
In low-information treatments (A and B), each player receives a non-overlapping 
information endowment of two database entries drawn from among the four entries comprising 
the complete database. In high-information treatments (C and D), each player receives four 
entries drawn randomly with replacement. There is common knowledge that both players' ex-
ante information sets overlap with very high probability. Players earn financial rewards (with 
11 
 
either cooperative bonuses or tournament bonuses as described below) on the basis of a test of 
the accuracy of their view (i.e., guess, conjecture, or estimate) of the complete database. 
Financial bonuses are only awarded for submitting a perfectly accurate view of the database.   
Information sharing incurs an explicit financial cost of $1 per database entry shared with 
the other player. The monetary cost of sharing information is intended to represent tangible, 
strategic and/or psychological costs (as described, for example, in Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002).8 
Monetary cost per-information-unit-shared is an experimental design parameter that generates 
easy-to-measure trade-offs between explicit costs of sharing information (which are known as 
common knowledge) and the benefit of higher expected payoffs from cooperatively sharing 
information. Although costly, sharing information is the only way (in the model and experiment) 
to guarantee that one or more players can achieve an accurate view of the database and reveal, 
for the benefit of the parent organization, how observable characteristics map into target/non-
target status.  
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 In contrast to this paper (in which the monetary costs of information sharing are an exogenous 
theoretical and experimental design parameter), Dyer and Chu (2003) investigate trust as the 
variable that drives variation in perceived transaction costs of information sharing. Information-
sharing costs could be varied in our experimental framework by introducing new treatments with 
different cost structures for passing information. The predictions of the theoretical model (of the 
stage game in Appendices A and B) are highly robust to variation in this cost parameter, 
however. That means the equilibrium predictions are stable over a very wide range around the 
value of $1 per database entry. Fulk, Heino, Flanagin, Monge and Bar (2004) report evidence 
indicating the importance of the costs of sharing information in explaining observed decisions 
about sharing information. Hansen's (2002) work focuses on the fixed costs of maintaining 
information-sharing networks rather than variable costs (that depend on the number of database 
entries shared as in the present paper). Fixed costs, within bounds, could be included in our 
model without changing its qualitative predictions. 
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Cooperative and Tournament Bonus Payments 
The experimental design's main treatment variable is cooperative versus tournament 
bonus payments. In the cooperative treatments (A and C), both players receive bonus payments 
of $12 if either player achieves an accurate view of the database. In the tournament treatments (B 
and D), the first player to achieve an accurate view of the database receives a bonus of $24.9 As 
described earlier, treatments also vary the number of database entries in players' information 
endowments. In low-information treatments (A and B), each player's information endowment 
contains two database entries that do not overlap with the other player's endowment. In high-
information treatments (C and D), the two players' endowments consist of four entries that are 
very likely to contain repeats (since they were drawn with replacement) and overlap with the 
other player's information endowment.  
Treatments are sequenced so that around half of participants are exposed to cooperative 
Treatment A first (according to the sequence A-B-C-D) and half are exposed to a tournament 
Treatment B (sequence B-A-D-C). This generates information from which subsequent data 
analyses extract evidence about path dependence. This evidence will be referred to as order-of-
treatment effects, which show whether previous incentive schemes produce measurable 
spillovers influencing present information-sharing behavior after new incentive schemes have 
                                                 
9
 Gibson, Waller, Carpenter and Conte (2007) demonstrate the importance of speed and timing 
within multi-national organizations, providing motivation for the introduction of timing-
contingent bonuses in Treatments B and D. Although it would have been possible for speed to 
have determined which participant received the bonus payoff in any of the 1,600 pair-rounds we 
observed, it was accuracy rather than speed that determined which player got the bonus in the 
overwhelming majority of cases (more than 97% of 1,600 group observations, pooling over the 
two tournament treatments). 
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been introduced. Participants are paid at the conclusion of the experimental session for a 
randomly chosen round determined by a participant rolling two dice that generate random 
numbers from 1 to 64.  
Decision 1: #Shared 
When information endowments are comprised of 2 entries, the range of choices for 
#Shared is 0, 1 or 2. When information endowments are comprised of 4 entries, the range 
expands to integers from 0 to 4. The two players move simultaneously, which means they cannot 
condition their decisions on the contemporaneous (i.e., same-round) decisions of the other 
player.10  
Pairing and Re-Pairing of Players for 16-Round Repeated Interaction in Each 
Treatment 
Participants are randomly paired for each 16-round treatment. During the 16 rounds of 
each treatment, the composition of each pair is fixed (i.e., players stick with the same "other 
player.") Before the next treatment begins, participants are re-paired with a new person in the 
role of "other player," fixing the participants in each pair for the next16 rounds of the following 
treatment. Therefore, each treatment is a repeated interaction with the same "other person." The 
t-values presented in all subsequent tables are corrected to allow for within-pair dependence over 
the multiple pair-rounds in which group outcomes are observed. Clustering on pair ids for each 
treatment allows for within-pair correlation among error terms over the rounds in which each 
pair interacted. Clustering with robust standard errors produces the larger (more conservative) 
standard errors and smaller t statistics reported subsequently in the regression results.  
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 Appendix 3 shows a screen shot of the z-tree interface eliciting #Shared. 
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Decision 2: Falsification 
 After choosing the quantity of information to share, players next face a z-tree computer 
screen requiring them to "fill in," using a mouse, all database entries they wish to share. 
Although participants can always see the entries in their endowments, they are not presented 
with a list of those entries and prompted to simply point and click. Instead, the computer 
interface requires those who have chosen to share to do the electronic equivalent of writing 
database entries by hand. Each of the three components of every database entry (x1, x2, y) must 
be selected using toggle switches that allow for any possible database entry to be shared rather 
than restricting to the list of entries one knows to be true (i.e., the entries received in one's 
information endowment).11 
With the goal of avoiding normative priming, refraining from tacit suggestions or any 
expressions of judgment about the right way to share information, the pre-experiment training 
makes clear to participants that they are not required or expected to pass only database entries 
they know to be true (i.e., the ones received in their information endowment). Because each 
player sees his or her information endowment (which remains visible on the screen while filling 
in the database entries to be shared), it is very easy for participants to have full self-awareness of, 
and control over, the decision to pass an entry he or she knows to be untrue. 
Falsification is coded as a binary outcome = 1 if an individual passes one or more 
database entries that do not match any of the entries in his or her information endowment. A 
player can falsify and accidently share an entry that is in fact true. Thus, falsification here is 
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 Appendix 4 shows a screen shot of a player who has already decided to share two database 
entries "filling in" each component of the entries they intend to share.  
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defined solely in terms of what the person doing the sharing knows at the time the information is 
shared. Falsification is obvious, easy to avoid, and therefore interpreted as deliberate whenever it 
is occurs. Since information is costly and success depends on sharing, falsification is never a 
payoff-maximizing strategy.12 
Test of Accuracy, Decision 3 (Distrust) and Bonus Payments  
 Once the shared database entries (if any) are received on both sides, each player is tested 
on the accuracy of his or her view (i.e., estimate or guess) of the complete database by describing 
the target- or y-values associated with each of the four vectors of x-characteristics in the 
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 Lau and Cobb (2010) distinguish calculus-based versus relationship-based trust. There is 
tension between these (and the potential presence of both) aspects, because the standard own-
payoff-maximizing prescription would, if common knowledge, lead both players to predict zero 
falsification from other players. This is true in both cooperative and tournament incentive 
treatments. Once a player sees that the other player falsifies (even occasionally), this already 
reveals that the other player is not best-responding or playing a Nash Equilibrium strategy. More 
can be said, however, because there is no belief that can rationalize an own-payoff-maximizing 
to falsify. It is always cheaper to withhold information than pass false information. This means 
that when the other player is observed to falsify, then his or her partner can logically conclude 
that the person who falsified is not a rational own-payoff maximizer or otherwise believes in a 
behavioral (i.e., non-maximizing) theory of the other player. For example, a player might believe 
the other player pays attention to the number of entries shared but cannot detect when a false 
piece of information is shared. Under this behavioral theory of the other player, one could reason 
that the other player will retaliate harshly if I withhold information, which would imply that it 
costs less to sneak a false piece of information (thereby reducing the chance that others receive 
the bonus payment) in tournament treatments. Whether this could be an effective strategy 
depends crucially on: whether the passing of false information is detected; beliefs about that 
event's probability; and beliefs about likely reactions from the other player. Butler's (1999) 
experimental study of the quantity of information shared as a function of trust versus distrust   
links trust to greater quantities shared and profits. 
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database.13  While participants undertake this test of accuracy, their information endowments are 
continuously displayed onscreen together with any database entries received from the other 
player, which are clearly indicated as such. For example, if player 1 has a two-entry endowment 
and receives two non-false entries from player 2, then player 1 will achieve accuracy in his or her 
view of the database (so long as player 2 did not falsify and player 1 does not distrust the true 
information that was received).  
We can only partially observe distrust. Behavioral (rather than introspective or 
subjective) distrust occurs when an entry is received from the other player and the receiver then 
contradicts the target value of the received entry when performing the test for accuracy. For 
example, if a player receives the database entry consisting of the 1x3 row vector (Pakistani, 
Pashto, not target) but indicates the row vector (Pakistani, Pashto, target) on his or her accuracy 
test, which matches on x1 and x2 but mismatches on the y-value, then this response would be 
classified as an instance of behavioral distrust. A limitation of this measure can be seen when 
Player 1 distrusts what was received from Player 2 and randomly guesses one or more entries (in 
the accuracy test) that happen to have been shared by Player 2. In that case, Player 1's guess 
coincides with what Player 2 shared and, therefore, there is no observable instance of distrust to 
record. This example shows the incompleteness of the observational definition of distrust, which 
fails to record any such unobservable instances of distrust.  
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 A screenshot of the accuracy test is provided in Appendix 5. The accuracy test can be 
represented as filling in the following four blanks 
(0, 0, _), (0, 1, _), (1, 0, _), and (1, 1, _), 
while the information endowment and any information received from the other player are 
simultaneously displayed on screen. 
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 One way to be inaccurate is to have received too few entries from the other player so that 
guessing is required and then guess incorrectly. Another way to be inaccurate is to distrust a 
received entry which is in fact true. The third way to be inaccurate is to not distrust when one or 
more received entries has been falsified by the other player.14 As stated in an earlier subsection 
(explaining cooperative versus tournament treatments), in cooperative treatments, bonus 
payments are paid to both players if either one achieves accuracy. In tournament treatments, 
bonus payments are paid only to the first player to achieve accuracy. The combination of these 
two simple decisions (#Shared and Falsification) and the binary outcome coded as the variable 
Accuracy generate the dynamic data (i.e. this round's outcomes conditional on the previous 
round's outcomes) used in subsequent estimation of reaction functions. These in turn provide 
new empirical information about the components of the information-sharing decision process 
that appear to be effected by (or insensitive to) incentives.  
Feedback 
After all decisions are made in a particular round, the round concludes by announcing to 
each player: both players' individual accuracy, who received bonuses, and a summary of one's 
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 In Treatments A and B where information endowments consist of two entries, the choices of 
truthful sharing can be denoted 0, 1, 2 and choices when one or two shared entries are false as 
F1, F2, respectively. When choosing to share no entries, there is no distinction between sharing 
0 true versus 0 false entries. In normal form payoff matrix in Appendices A and B, the action 0 is 
grouped with the truthful sharing strategies. Conditional on the other player sharing one or two 
entries, either true or false, (i.e., 1, 2, F1, or F2), the player can be observed to distrust or not 
distrust. When the other player shares 0 database entries, the decision to distrust defaults to not 
distrust. This leads to an action space that has five elements {0, 1, 2, F1, or F2}×{not distrust } 
conditional on the other person sharing zero, and ten elements {0, 1, 2, F1, or F2}×{not distrust,  
distrust } conditional on the other person sharing one or two. 
18 
 
own information-sharing costs and total net payoff for that round (if it is selected at random to be 
the one for which participants are actually paid).15 The random-round payoff technique is 
typically used to induce participants to play each round as if it were a one-off (thereby avoiding 
accumulating income and risk-diversification motives that experimental economists worry can 
contaminate behavioral data when participants are paid on the basis of total earnings 
accumulated over all experimental rounds). Nevertheless, the data indicate there is a very strong 
tendency to base current decisions on what others have done in the recent past.  
 
Descriptive Statistics and Unconditional Differences by Treatment 
Table 2 presents means by treatment for #Shared (measuring the number of database 
entries shared on a scale of 0-2 in Treatments A and B and 0-4 in Treatments C and D) in 
addition to rates of Falsification and Accuracy (on 0-100 percentage-point scales).  The data 
consist of 1,600 individual-round observations per treatment (i.e., 100 individuals observed over 
16 rounds). In contrast to individual-round observations in Table 2, the primary unit of 
observation in the regression results presented in the next section is a pair of players in a single 
round, referred to as pair-rounds.  
Comparing cooperative versus tournament incentives in Table 2 reveals sharp reductions 
in the mean quantity of information shared when cooperative incentives are in place: 1.616 
database entries shared in cooperative Treatment A falling to 1.284 entries in tournament 
Treatment B (both with low-information, two-entry endowments), and 1.721 entries in C falling 
to 1.140 entries in D (both with high-information, four-entry endowments). The unconditional 
                                                 
15
 Appendix 6 shows a screenshot of the individual-specific feedback that each player receives at 
the conclusion of each round. 
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cooperative-versus-tournament differences in Table 2 easily achieve high degrees of statistical 
significance even after accounting for within-pair correlations among multiple observations 
collected from the same pair. Although mean rates of falsification are modest overall, Table 2 
shows Falsification to be far higher in tournament treatments. Accuracy, interpreted as a proxy 
for organizational performance in tasks with demanding informational requirements, decline 
sharply under tournament incentives. 
Comparing low- versus high-information treatments with the same incentive scheme (i.e., 
A versus C and B versus D) reveals quantity-of-information effects that some may regard as 
counter-intuitive. Following a doubling of the number of database entries in each participant's 
initial endowment each round under cooperative incentives, the change in mean #Shared 
(comparing Treatments A and C) is statistically indistinguishable from zero, rising by less than 
one tenth of one database entry (from 1.616 to 1.721, or 6% with p-value = 0.277).  Under 
tournament incentives, doubling information endowments leads to significantly less sharing, as 
mean #Shared declines from 1.284 to 1.140 (or 11%, p-value = 0.016).  
Beyond these information effects (i.e., no increase in sharing under cooperative 
incentives and a decline in sharing under tournament incentives after the information 
endowments double), the mean accuracy rates in Table 2 reveal another curious less-is-more 
effect. Accuracy rates are significantly lower when players are endowed with more information. 
This pattern points to the possibility that larger quantities of information may paradoxically lead 
to declines in accuracy or organizational performance regardless of whether incentives are 
cooperative or individualistic.  
 
Results 
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Empirical Reaction Functions 
Having described the unconditional information-sharing outcomes, this section presents 
empirical estimates of the mean individual's reaction function under different incentive schemes 
conditional on previous-round information-sharing outcomes. The goal is to look for evidence 
about the decision processes underlying the unconditional incentive effects reported in Table 2. 
The reaction functions are of interest because they point to the conditionality of information-
sharing strategies on cues that modulate information sharing, falsification and accuracy, and 
provide new descriptive information about the decision processes that generate dynamics of 
observed information-sharing behavior. The empirical reaction functions indicate whether 
incentive schemes primarily influence behavior by shifting intrinsic components of the 
information-sharing decision process (i.e., the components of the individual reaction function 
that do not depend on what other people in the organization do) or by shifting conditional 
responses to other people's actions (and outcomes such as Accuracy and the bonus payments that 
depend on Accuracy under cooperative incentives that others partially influence). 
 Using pair-rounds as the unit of observation for estimating empirical reaction functions 
that describe information-sharing dynamics in the data, the sample size is 750 based on 50 pairs 
per treatment observed over 15 rounds (since lagged outcomes are available only in rounds 2 
through 16). Paired decisions from the previous round summarize information-sharing outcomes 
from the recent past and serve as the right-hand-side conditioning information in the regression 
models presented in this section.  
Testing Restrictions on the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model  
The methodological issue of how to test whether regression coefficients on a particular 
lagged right-hand-side outcome are equal across different treatments merits some 
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methodological discussion. The approach taken is to estimate a seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) model, which is equivalent to running separate regressions on each treatment or, 
equivalently, a fully interacted single-equation model pooling pair-round observations from all 
treatments while allowing coefficients to vary by treatment. For example, the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient on last period's own #Shared is equal across Treatments A and B (or that all 
coefficients in A and B are the same) is nested in the SUR model as an easy-to-test linear 
restriction. The regression results report t statistics based on robust standard errors that cluster at 
the level of pairs (i.e., group ids), which allows error terms in the regression model to be 
correlated within each paired group over the 15 pair-rounds in each treatment.  
Falsification and accuracy are binary dependent variables and #Shared is a discrete 
integer-valued dependent variable. We ran probit/logit and ordered probit/logit models with 
marginal effects computed at the mean and found results qualitatively similar to the linear 
models reported in this section, which simplify interpretation without marginal effects depending 
on particular values of the right-hand side variables.  
Results for #Shared 
Table 3 presents the empirical reaction function for #Shared as a linear regression model. 
The coefficient 0.523 on Own_#Shared_Lag in Treatment A is interpreted as a persistence-of-
sharing parameter that measures the component of the mean respondent's inter-temporal sharing 
rule that is independent from actions by others. Recall that the mean participant shared 1.6 
database entries in Treatment A. The contribution to expected current-round sharing from 
previous-round sharing at the mean is therefore 1.6*0.523 = 0.84 database entries. Therefore, 
about half of the observed quantity of information shared in cooperative Treatment A can be 
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explained by sheer persistence or preference for sharing (apart from the influence of the other 
player's decisions).  
Notice, however, that in Treatment A, when a participant has made a previous decision to 
pass false information (i.e., the binary event of own falsification), this wipes away roughly half 
the contribution of intrinsic persistence in expected sharing: 1.6*0.523 – 0.426 = 0.41 (p = 
0.0577, not reported in Table 3). For a person who shared one false (and zero true) database 
entries in the previous round, the first two coefficients in Table 3 imply a persistence factor that 
is indistinguishable from zero: 0.523 – 0.426 (p = 0.5340, not reported in Table 3).  
Comparing coefficients on Own_#Shared_Lag across treatments, one observes 
remarkable consistency. The null of equal coefficients (0.523 and 0.507) in Treatments A and B 
cannot be rejected (p = 0.8010). Although the null of equal coefficients in Treatments C and D is 
rejected (p = 0.0008).  But the magnitudes of persistence as measured by the coefficient on 
Own_#Shared_Lag in Treatments C and D do not seem to be substantially different.  
Next consider responses to the other player's sharing and falsification decisions. The 
coefficients on Other's_#Shared_Lag and Other's_Falsified_Lag reveal interesting differences 
between treatments. The large-magnitude negative coefficient -0.434 in Treatment A (Table 3) 
implies that if the other person falsifies, then the positive effect of the other person having shared 
the mean number of database entries in the previous round is completely erased: 0.258*1.6 – 
0.434 = -.0212 (p =  0.9283). This coefficient of -0.434 can be interpreted as evidence of a 
conditional punishment mechanism in the decision processes of participants: whenever the other 
player falsifies, the mean participant retaliates by withholding information that he or she would 
have otherwise shared. Based on the cross-treatment p-value of 0.0115 for Other's_Falsified_Lag 
(corresponding to the null of equal coefficients in Treatments A and B), retaliatory withholding 
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of information as a form of conditional punishment appears to support higher mean rates of 
sharing under cooperative incentives to a substantially greater degree than under competitive 
incentives: -0.434 versus -0.016 in Treatment A than in Treatment B, the difference of which is 
statistically and economically significant. Cooperative incentives appear to trigger negative 
reciprocity (manifest as conditional punishment) as a mechanism for maintaining high levels of 
information sharing that is not observed when participants face tournament incentives. With 
greater endowments of information, the conditional punishment coefficients are indistinguishable 
from zero in Treatments C and D, reflecting statistical imprecision or sampling error associated 
with the fact that falsification is a relatively rare event.   
One of the most noticeable results from Table 3 is the similar-sized coefficients on 
Other's_#Shared_Lag across all four treatments: 0.258 in A; 0.231 in B; 0.382 in C; and 0.206 in 
D.16  These estimated coefficients can be interpreted as evidence of a persistent psychological 
mechanism employing conditional cooperation, which is little effected by different incentive 
schemes. This coefficient measuring conditional cooperation is significantly larger in Treatment 
C than in A (0.382 versus 0.258, p =  0.0011) and larger in C versus D (0.382 versus 0.206, p = 
                                                 
16
 There is a substantial literature on conditional cooperation. For example, Fischbacher, 
Gaechter, and Fehr (2001) find that half of the people in their experiment were willing to 
increase contributions to a public good in response to increases in the average contribution by 
others. At the same time, 30% of participants were determined free riders (contributing zero). 
Keser and Van Winden (2000) have found similar conditional cooperation in distribution of 
public good and free riders when the group of subjects played game repeatedly. In our data, the 
rate at which both players simultaneously shared zero was 16% based on 50 (pairs) *64 (rounds) 
= 3200 observations of pairs. By treatment, rates at which both people in the paired observations 
shared zero were: 3.4% in Treatment A, 9.4% in B, 16% in C, and 35% in D. Across all 
treatments and rounds, there were always more pairs with one or more individuals sharing than 
there were pairs with two individuals both sharing zero. 
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0.0442 ).  Despite the larger effect in Treatment C, however, the interesting observation from our 
point of view is the large-magnitude effects indicating conditional cooperation based on the other 
player's previous-round sharing (Other's_#Shared_Lag). Across all treatments, the effect of this 
lagged variable on current-round own sharing (Own_#Shared) is positive and significantly 
different from zero by a wide margin using conservative standard errors.  
If cooperative financial incentives were required to induce real people to incur the costs 
of passing information to an anonymous other person (as opposed to own-payoff maximizers in 
the theoretical model who are predicted to free-ride and share zero database entries in 
tournament Treatments B and D), then we would expect one of two things. If the own-payoff-
maximizing model upon which the predictions of game theory are based were correct, then there 
would be no statistically significant reaction function conditioning on the other player's actions 
and outcomes that the other person influenced. Own-payoff maximizers would choose a Nash 
strategy and simply stick with it across all 16 rounds as long as the same incentive scheme were 
in place. Thus, if participants in the experimental lab were guided by game theoretic reasoning 
plus a random error term, the predicted result would be zero coefficients on the other player's 
sharing and falsification. (Without random noise, the regression would be un-estimable because 
of zero variation).  
The other possibility, drawing on standard public goods games and the problem of free 
riding, would be an inexorable spiral toward zero sharing whenever the extrinsic reward for 
cooperating were absent (i.e., in tournament Treatments B and D). This prediction is easily 
rejected by the data. The coefficients on Other's_#Shared_Lag provide evidence of robust 
conditional cooperation regardless of differences in explicit financial incentives. Note, however, 
that the robustness of this conditional cooperation mechanism across treatments does not imply 
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that treatments had no measurable effects on other components of participants' conditional 
reaction functions. Indeed, the four p-values for the null of all coefficients being equal across 
treatments indicate statistically significant differences in every pair of treatments. 
Information endowments in high-information treatments (C and D) are drawn from the 
complete database with replacement, which introduces uncertainty not in the number of database 
entries (which is always 4 in Treatments C and D) but in the number of unique database entries. 
Including controls for the number of unique database entries reveals that when participants 
possess more unique information then sharing declines sharply in Treatment C. This would seem 
to imply that when participants are endowed with enough information that they believe their 
view of the organization's data is nearly complete, then they tend to "go it alone" (i.e., they stop 
sharing information). Although this own-unique-information effect disappears in Treatment D, 
the other player's possession of greater amounts of unique information significantly reduces own 
sharing in both Treatments C and D. This result demonstrates yet another channel through which 
greater quantities of information may hinder sharing even when sharing is required to achieve 
high rates of accuracy despite the greater endowments of information in individuals' personal 
possession.  
Table 3 shows evidence of conditional effects of past success (i.e., accuracy) on present 
sharing. In competitive treatments, succeeding at achieving an accurate view of the database in 
the previous round increases expected #Shared by 0.142 (in Treatment B) and 0.211 (in 
Treatment D), both significantly different from coefficients on the same variable in cooperative 
treatments (p = 0.0326 and 0.0022, respectively). Thus, success begets sharing even in 
tournament environments with highly individualistic rewards. This result suggests that 
individualistic incentives do not necessarily undermine sharing as long as individuals and 
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divisions experience success with respect to their organizational objectives with sufficient 
frequency. 
As mentioned already, the joint hypothesis that all coefficients in Treatments A and B are 
equal is rejected (p = 0.0419), as is the null that all coefficients in Treatments C and D are equal 
(p = 0.0000).   This provides additional evidence that switching from tournament to cooperative 
incentives (or vice versa) does indeed shift the reaction functions that determine information-
sharing outcomes.   
A closer look at the small and statistically insignificant differences between coefficients 
across treatments in Table 3, however, reveals several surprises. The first two rows of 
coefficients represent the intrinsic or persistent component of the mean participant's reaction 
function (i.e., not conditional on the other player's actions). According to Table 3, cooperative 
incentives have no significant effect on those components of individual reaction functions that 
are independent of other people's decisions. Cooperative incentives, once again, do not have 
large effects on conditional cooperation (i.e., the coefficient on the other person's previous-round 
sharing). The conditional cooperation coefficients survive robustly across all treatments (as 
evidenced by large, nonzero and statistically significant coefficients on the other person's sharing 
in the previous round) although they are not significantly different across incentive schemes.  
Based on Table 3, incentives appear to operate most powerfully on information sharing 
by activating conditional punishment. When the environment is explicitly structured to 
encourage cooperation, information sharing improves mostly because of the external costs that 
cooperative-norm-violating behavior imposes on others activate stronger punishment which 
leads to greater levels of sharing. Cooperative incentives distribute both rewards from success 
more widely and the pain of forgone success when groups fail to perform. Thus, cooperative 
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incentives shift attention in ways that make others' bad behavior salient to more observers within 
the group or organization. This seems consistent with the observation (from post-experiment 
survey questionnaires) that, when paired with a free rider or falsifier, the player on the receiving 
end of this bad behavior (i.e., the problems of being in a group where others are withholding or 
falsifying information) tends to experience more anger and frustration under cooperative 
incentives than under tournament incentives.  
The results in Table 3 suggest what appears to be an under-appreciated mechanism by 
which cooperative incentives succeed at shifting behavior in ways that better serve the goals of 
the organization. The mechanism is as described in the previous paragraph: cooperative 
incentives distribute losses more widely and cue punishment (likely based on a more widely 
distributed understanding of the group's opportunity cost when selfish or norm-violating 
behavior hurts the group's performance). Mutually shared awareness of the opportunity costs of 
poor organizational performance which are more widely distributed under cooperative incentives 
and the conditional punishment that individuals can expect if caught behaving non-cooperatively 
in an environment incentivized to reward cooperation seems to be the most important difference 
between the reaction functions in Table 3 under cooperative versus tournament incentives.  
Participants conditionally cooperate (rather admirably) regardless of which incentive 
scheme they face. Only when things go wrong in cooperative reward schemes do the individual 
reactions to non-cooperative behavior impose a sufficiently large threat to bring about greater 
levels of information sharing. The models in Table 3 suggest that this mechanism is the primary 
reason why cooperative incentives improve quantities of information shared.  
Results for Falsification 
28 
 
Falsification is a relatively rare event. Consequently, the statistical models of current-
round falsification conditional on previous-round information-sharing outcomes in Table 4 have 
weaker explanatory power. Table 4 shows that people respond differently to other players who 
withhold information than they do to other players who falsify. In Treatment A, for example, if 
the other player falsified in the previous round, then the chance of own falsification declines. 
This pattern suggests that withholding information by the other player rather than falsification is 
the primary cue triggering retaliatory falsification in Treatment A. In Treatment B on the other 
hand, Table 4 indicates strong evidence that falsification by the other player in the previous 
round cues current-round retaliatory falsification.17 These effects are muted in high-information 
Treatments C and D where there is greater uncertainty about whether falsification can be easily 
detected because of the positive probability that the two players have overlapping endowments 
(which had zero chance of occurring in Treatments A and B). This would seem to explain why 
mean rates of falsification are lower in Treatments C and D.  
From the observed asymmetry of reactions to withholding information in cooperative 
treatments, and to falsification in competitive treatments, we note, once again, cooperative 
incentives do their work (i.e., trigger substantial shifts in behavior) by shifting what it is that 
individuals choose to punish. The reason, once again, would seem to be that cooperative 
incentives widely distribute the shared costs of forgone organizational success. Greater 
                                                 
17
 Fehr and Schmidt (2006, p5) seek to define the terms "cooperation," "retaliation," and 
"reciprocity" more narrowly than is used in this paper: "It is important to emphasize that it is not 
the expectation of future material benefits that drives reciprocity. Reciprocal behavior as defined 
above differs fundamentally from 'cooperative' or 'retaliatory' behavior in repeated interactions 
that is motivated by future material benefits. Therefore, reciprocal behavior in one-shot 
interactions is often called 'strong reciprocity' in contrast to 'weak reciprocity' that is motivated 
by long-term self-interest in repeated interactions.” 
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appreciation by many people in an organization of the opportunity cost of failing to cooperate 
appears to be the primary reason why cooperative incentives effectively increase cooperation at 
least in the context of the experiment reported in this paper.  
Falsification reduces group success (i.e., Accuracy) in all treatments. Compared to 
tournament incentives where retaliatory falsification tends to persist more strongly, cooperative 
incentives appear to raise awareness about the shared cost of falsifying information. The 
falsification reaction functions in Table 4 lend support for earlier interpretations of the data as 
revealing robust conditional cooperation across all treatments contrasting with strong treatment 
effects cueing distinct mechanisms of punishment that support differential levels of group 
performance, which we turn to next. 
Results for Accuracy 
Table 5 presents expected accuracy conditional on outcomes in the previous round. 
Across all treatments except for C, own sharing has a positive conditional effect on accuracy 
and, by extension, organizational success. Similarly, the coefficients on Other's_#Shared_Lag 
qualitatively confirm that receiving shared information improves one's chances of accuracy. 
Own falsification is generally bad for success as is having partners that falsify. 
One surprising finding in Table 5 is the large positive coefficients on 
Own_Accuracy_Lag.  The positive coefficients of 0.197 and 0.146 (in Treatments A and B, 
respectively) indicate that success begets success and that self-reinforcing cycles of success in 
the information gathering task are present in the data. The persistence or serial correlation of 
success provides additional evidence that participants use adaptive information-sharing rules 
conditional on recent successes and failures. The finding that accuracy in the current round 
depends conditionally on accuracy in the previous round once again contradicts the prediction of 
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zero correlation (round-over-round) from the theory that people play Nash strategies with an 
additive random noise term. According to the predictions of game-theoretic rational choice 
theory with an additive noise term, there should be a fixed probability of success picked up by 
the constant term in the regression with zero serial correlation of Accuracy if participants were 
playing noisy Nash strategies. 
As an example of how serial correlation in Accuracy might arise, consider a pair of 
players whose accuracy dips during a spell in which they experiment with falsification and free 
riding. Following this spell of low accuracy with self-reinforcing reciprocal punishment, the 
participants would, thanks to random experimentation, experience a random instance of 
cooperative success (i.e., achieving accuracy in the information gathering task) with one or more 
group members having shared in the previous round. At this point, the conditional cooperation 
components of participants' reaction function would cue more sharing on the basis of last round's 
sharing (i.e., self-reinforcing conditional cooperation), leading to a spell of rounds characterized 
by higher rates of accuracy. Although cooperative information sharing under both incentive 
schemes can (and does) derail resulting in multiple rounds of retaliatory conditional punishment 
when a participant (either randomly or intentionally) plays uncooperatively in a cooperative 
treatment, it only takes one brief success at sharing and achieving accuracy for conditional 
cooperation amplifies past cooperation and guides this behavior to continue in future rounds with 
high probability.    
To summarize findings from the unconditional mean differences in information sharing 
reported in Table 2 and the reaction functions in Tables 3-5, we note that unconditional means 
across treatments in Table 2 showed large increases in sharing when incentives were cooperative 
even though Tables 3-5 demonstrated surprising robustness of conditional cooperation under 
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both cooperative and tournament incentives. Reinforcing this interpretation, notice in Table 5 
that in both tournament Treatments B and D (in contrast to cooperative Treatments A and C) that 
the other person's quantity of information shared and accuracy in the previous period exert 
stronger influence on own accuracy in tournament treatments than in cooperative treatments. 
This suggests that success in groups with highly individualistic incentives depends equally if not 
more critically on conditional cooperation.  Tables 3-5 show evidence of rather agile adaptation 
toward success using conditional cooperation under all incentive schemes. The explanation for 
large increases in sharing and reductions in falsification in cooperative treatments reported in 
Table 2 is the important treatment effects on negative reciprocity.  Taken together, Table 2 in 
combination with Tables 3-5 reveal that negative reciprocity provides an additional boost of 
support for sharing and success. But this threat of more intense retaliation that triggers more 
cooperative behavior is much more pronounced under cooperative incentives.  
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Order-of-Treatment Effects 
 There is an important question of whether the order in which people experience different 
incentive schemes leads to lasting effects (i.e., historical dependence that causes measurably 
distinct behavioral reactions in a given incentive scheme based on exposure to different 
incentives that were present in the past). It may be rather ambitious to expect distinct "cultures" 
of cooperation and competition to emerge in a two-hour laboratory experiment, although 
surprisingly malleable shifts in group identity in laboratory experiments have been reported 
(Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby, 1992). Roughly half the experimental participants in the present 
study faced alternating cooperative-then-tournament treatments (A-B-C-D) while the other half 
faced tournament-then-cooperative sequences (B-A-D-C). Table 6 reports mean #Shared by 
order-of-treatment and tests the null hypothesis of no order-of-treatment effects.  
 We interpret these results cautiously while noting that those exposed to cooperative 
incentives first tend to share greater quantities of information in cooperative treatments. In 
tournament Treatment D, however, they share significantly less. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that cooperative reward structures activate deep-rooted mental processes of 
conditional cooperation and punishment. This can lead to higher levels of cooperative 
information sharing when teams are functioning well and would-be non-cooperators face more 
intense retaliatory withholding and falsification of information whenever violations of 
cooperative norms occur. Investigating whether tit-for-tat conditional cooperation serves 
organizational objectives well by maintaining necessary levels of information sharing or perhaps 
generates damaging adversarial framings among divisions within an organization would of 
course require more context specificity describing a particular organization's goals as well as the 
costs and benefits of adversarial decision making. We simply note that, in some settings, 
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negative reciprocity as a descriptive feature of information sharing behavior could, at least in 
theory, generate beneficial returns in the form of future cooperation. (For more on costs of 
negative reciprocity and the frequency of punishment, see the experimental studies of sabotage in 
Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008, 2011).  
The order-of-treatment effects in Table 6 are suggestive of historical dependence 
(Harbring, 2010). An implication of this is that organizations such as the Department of 
Homeland Security that have attempted to shift from previously parochial or tournament-style 
organizational culture toward cooperative information sharing may not realize the desired 
behavioral responses to the new incentives they are attempting to introduce. Or perhaps the 
targeted behavioral change may not occur as rapidly, or, to as great an extent, as would be the 
case for a new organization without its historical path that, in light of the evidence in Table 6, 
would appear to condition the way individuals respond to shifts in the organization's incentive 
scheme. 
 
Policy Implications? 
The success of groups that learn how damaging falsification is and respond adaptively to 
the salience of shared costs from bad behavior when cooperative incentives are present makes 
use of information acquired from both failures and successes in the recent past. This is evident in 
the coefficients conditioning present outcomes on the previous round's sharing, falsification and 
accuracy. At the same time, the coefficients on own sharing are far less sensitive to incentive 
treatments than the own-financial-payoff-maximizing model predicts. As reported earlier, for 
example, sharing persists at levels substantially greater than the zero cooperation predicted by 
theory under tournament incentives. The data therefore provide a more subtle picture of incentive 
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effects, suggesting multiple motives for information sharing. Consequently, while incentives are 
important, they are hardly the only factors in the organizational environment that influences 
cooperation. This raises the question of what real-world managers should take away from the 
empirical description of dynamic information-sharing behavior presented in the previous 
section.18  
There is strong evidence of negative reciprocity as the primary mechanism that 
cooperative incentives activate: sharing less when others have shared less, and falsifying when 
others have falsified.19 Cooperative incentives appear to amplify those forms of conditional 
cooperation in the context of information sharing. This could be the most important take-away 
(and least appreciated empirical regularity among organizational leaders, such as those who 
sought creation of the Department of Homeland Security with the goal of improved information 
sharing). Rather than people sharing more because they are being explicitly rewarded for sharing 
more, cooperative incentive structures in this study appear to function primarily by focusing 
attention on the shared losses from bad behavior more salient and activating negatively 
reciprocal behavior.  
                                                 
18
 One must of course apply caution when extrapolating to real-world interventions designed to 
facilitate information sharing. Research on the positive effects of community-of-practice 
technologies and face-to-face contact would, however, seem to imply potential for the large 
incentive effects in the lab experiments described here to complement those used in practice 
(Malone, Grant, Turbak, Brobst and Cohen, 1987; Lee and Whang, 2004; Mengis and Eppler, 
2008; Griffith and Sawyer, 2010; Berg, Hoffrage and Abramczuk, 2010). 
19
 Arguing in favor of conditional cooperation over theories of intrinsic altruism as a valid 
description of widespread human behavior, Frey and Meier (2004, p1717) write: "if people 
behave according to pure altruism theories. . .they reduce their own contribution when informed 
that others are already contributing." 
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Incentivizing divisions within an organization to share more information by distributing 
rewards from successes does significantly increase the quantity and quality of information 
shared. Under cooperative incentives, participants achieved nearly optimal levels of sharing. 
Under tournament incentives, however, sharing persisted to a much higher degree than the "zero 
sharing" prediction of theory.  
Another important take-away for real-world organizations is the less-is-more effect with 
respect to quantity of information. Giving divisions more information leads them to share less, 
not more. In light of the dramatic increases in intelligence data being collected by US 
government agencies, the empirical results in this study raise concerns that the increased 
quantities of information being collected could paradoxically reduce inter-agency 
communication. Productive information sharing might very well be better supported by limiting 
the information collected by these agencies and instead working to transform organizational 
cultures along other dimensions.20 The evidence suggestive of path dependence reported in the 
                                                 
20
 Woolley (2009) analyzes knowledge teams within organizations by distinguishing outcome- 
versus process-focused priorities. This work suggests a worthwhile direction for expanding this 
paper's exclusive focus on monetary incentives. Instead, extensions of the experimental design 
might include process-oriented or procedural shifts as incentives that might induce more 
behavioral response than incentive schemes based solely on monetary outcomes. Another 
dimension of organizational decision making that would be interesting to pursue follows Man 
and Lam's (2003) study of individualism/collectivism and would include treatments that vary 
both task complexity and autonomy. Van de Ven, Rogers, Bechara and Sun (2008) present 
evidence from a longitudinal study of communication and organizational change among 37 
medical clinics, emphasizing the importance and challenges facing "integrative methods of open 
communications." While the communication analyzed in their paper clearly goes beyond data 
sharing as conceived in this paper's simple design, it nonetheless supports information sharing as 
36 
 
previous section hints at the possibility that something more fundamental than a merger of 
divisions could be required to succeed at wiping the slate clean and enabling improved intra-
agency communication without its historical path, laden with habits of "protecting one's turf," 
continuing to cast a shadow over information-sharing decisions.21 
 
Conclusion 
Given the prominence of the theory that excessively individualistic incentives lead to 
poor information sharing which, in turn, cause organizations to fail, this paper analyzed new 
experimental evidence concerning how information-sharing behavior responds to cooperative 
versus tournament incentive schemes. The experimental design is based on an information 
                                                                                                                                                             
a research priority and adds breadth, in our view, to the range of interpretations of the very 
general (because it is simple) notion of information sharing considered in this paper.  
21
 Thomas (1984) argues that disseminating statistical information to subsidiaries according to 
automated rules over which management has no discretionary control could help coordinate 
decisions among a multi-location organization. The effects of automation and elimination of 
discretion could be implemented as further treatments using the information-sharing game in 
future research. Mitsuhashi (2003) discusses how alliances that facilitate information sharing 
may paradoxically limit heterogeneity of the information one gathers, because alliances' 
information sets are correlated. The information-sharing subsidiaries in our experiment comprise 
only a single alliance and their information sets are perfectly (in Treatments A and B) or near-
perfectly (in Treatments C and D) complementary. The possibility that alliances cluster around 
other dimensions of similarity where that information is least valuable for the organization is yet 
another direction for extending the information-sharing game in future research: allowing for 
multiple alliances and variation in the correlatedness of players' information endowments. 
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sharing game that makes clear predictions about the effects of different incentive schemes on 
quantities of information shared, falsification, and accuracy as a proxy for organizational 
performance. 
The data show that cooperative incentives in the lab do succeed at increasing quantities of 
shared information. The mechanism for this, however, does not work by shifting intrinsic 
preferences for, or the persistence of, sharing. Rather, the empirical reaction functions reported 
in this paper show that cooperative incentives operate primarily by intensifying negative 
reciprocity in the form of retaliatory withholding of information and falsification.  
Distributing the rewards of success more widely also distributes the pain of failure more 
widely. Thus, cooperative incentives exert influence on sharing behavior primarily by making 
the costs of others' under-sharing and falsification more salient, activating willingness to 
undertake conditional punishment, and thereby enforce higher levels of cooperative sharing. The 
pessimistic theoretical prediction of zero sharing under tournament rewards is easily rejected by 
the data. And although there is measurably less sharing under tournament incentives, a rather 
large number of teams continue to conditionally cooperate and conditionally punish to sustain 
impressive levels of sharing and accuracy. These robust cooperators deviate from one-shot best-
response strategies in the theoretical model and, in so doing, perform better than they would have 
by Nash-best-responding. Although falsification is never a theoretical best response when 
players believe they are playing with own-monetary-payoff-maximizers, tournament incentives 
generate significantly higher rates of falsification. Falsification was not absent, however, under 
cooperative incentives. As a punishment mechanism to enforce future cooperation, it is possible 
that falsification may have played a productive role as punishment in support of adaptation 
toward cooperation in some teams.  
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Rates of accuracy in the information aggregation task increased 15 to 20 percentage 
points under cooperative incentives relative to base rates of around 50% under tournament 
incentives. Endowing participants with more information failed to increase (or reduced) sharing: 
High-information treatments also led to weak and/or counter-intuitive effects on accuracy. In 
tournament conditions, more information raised accuracy by less than 7 percentage points and 
reduced accuracy under cooperative incentives. Increased quantities of information do not appear 
to activate, and may detract from, effective information sharing. While the increased information 
content of larger datasets is understandably attractive, the less-is-more effects reported here 
(regarding quantities of information in one's possession and effective sharing of that information) 
raise questions about the information-sharing strategies of some organizations based on an 
apparent philosophy of more-is-better.  
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